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How do we make inferences about individuals based on sentences that involve predica-
tion over a plurality? For instance, why do we conclude from (1a) that it is the individual
children who laughed, and from (1b) that each of the girls probably had a beer of her own?
(1) a. The children laughed.
b. The girls had a beer.
In the early 1980s, two different answers to this question were proposed. According to Scha
(1981), there is no formal difference between the derivation of the distributive interpreta-
tion of the sentences in (1) - which supports the inference that the property expressed by
the predicate holds of the single individuals that make up the plural denotation - and the
derivation of the collective interpretation of sentences like the following, which does not
support such an inference:
(2) The children

gathered in the garden.
met last week.
are a good team.

Unlike the examples in (1), the sentences in (2) do not involve the ‘trickling down’ of the
predicate to individual members of the plurality but rather express that a certain property
holds of the plurality as a whole. In both cases, according to Scha, the predicate applies
directly to the denotation of the plural definite, and any information about the way its
individual members participate in the expressed event is part of the lexical semantics of the
predicate. We know that in order to be able to laugh one needs lungs and a vocal apparatus,
and we know that individuals have this but groups or collections do not; hence, we interpret
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The children laughed as a statement about individual children. Similarly, we know that
gathering cannot be done by single individuals but only by groups, and hence we interpret
the children gathered as a statement about a collection of children. Thus, according to
Scha’s analysis, collectivity and distributivity inferences with referential expressions are
not triggered by the compositional semantics of the sentences in question, but by lexical
information.
However, the account most widely adopted is the one originating in Link (1983), which
analyses distributivity in terms of a semantic operator comparable to the overt universal
quantifier each.1 This distributivity operator (henceforth D-operator) quantifies over the
members of a plurality, allowing the predicate to apply to each of these individuals.
In the most radical version of the operator-based analysis, exemplified by Link (1983),
there is a direct correlation between semantic mechanism and interpretation: a distributive
interpretation can only be derived by means of a D-operator. However, in this paper I will
argue (following Dowty 1987, Roberts 1987, Winter 1997 and Champollion 2010) that
there are two ways to derive distributivity: one involves the kind of conceptual reasoning
argued for by Scha, the other is operator-based. I show that we need a theory of lexical
distributivity to account for distributive interpretations with group nouns like team and
committee, as operator-based distributivity is systematically unavailable with these nouns.
An apparent counterexample to this claim are sentences like The team is wearing an or-
ange vest, whose distributive interpretation seems to require a covert quantifier over team
members to take scope over the indefinite. However, I argue that this is not a case of quan-
tificational distributivity, but of lexical distributivity over two arguments: a group and (an
individual correlate of) a property.
2. Distributivity with plurals and groups
2.1 Two kinds of distributivity
Adopting the terminology of Winter (1997), I will call the two kinds of distributivity that I
want to distinguish Q-distributivity, which corresponds to Link’s D-operator-based distri-
butivity, and P-distributivity, which corresponds to Scha’s lexical semantics-based distri-
butivity. Schematically:





1Link (1983) proposes an operator ? that pluralises distributive predicates like laugh; from the algebraic
properties of ? and the fact that its application is restricted to predicates that contain nothing but atomic
individuals in their extension, it follows that whenever a plurality is in the extension of ?P, P is true of
all the atoms that make up the plurality. The D-operator as covert each was proposed in Link (1987) and
further fleshed out by Roberts (1978). Unlike ?, the application of the D-operator is not a priori restricted to
a particular class of predicates, which enables a purely structural analysis of distributivity.
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Because the analysis in (3b) lacks a one-to-one correspondence between interpretation and
mechanics, it is important to keep the two apart in our terminology. I will use the terms
collectivity and distributivity to refer to interpretations, as follows:
(4) Suppose we have a sentence S of the form X Pred, where X is a plural, conjunction
or group noun, and Pred is a predicate. An interpretation of S is distributive if we
infer that [[Pred]](x) for every member x of [[X ]]; otherwise2 it is collective.
The two semantic mechanisms that I use to derive these interpretations are covert quantifi-
cation (for example by means of a D-operator), and direct predication over a collection.3
Formally:
(5) Suppose we have a sentence S of the form X Pred, where X is a plural, conjunction
or group noun, and Pred is a predicate:
a. Applying a D-operator derives the logical form ∀x ∈ [[X]] [[[Pred]](x)]
b. Direct predication over a collection derives the logical form [[Pred]]([[X ]]).
Finally, and somewhat obviously: a P-distributive interpretation is a distributive interpreta-
tion that is derived by direct predication over a collection. A Q-distributive interpretation
is a distributive interpretation that is derived by the D-operator.
There is no formal semantic difference between collectivity and P-distributivity in this ap-
proach, as they are modelled using precisely the same compositional mechanism. Rather,
the distinction between the two is entirely lexical: both collectivity and P-distributivity are
rooted in the lexical semantics of the predicate and our reasoning about parts and wholes
with respect to the predicate meaning. Hence, The children laughed receives a distribu-
tive interpretation, and The children are a good team a collective one. A sentence like The
2For now, I am ignoring cases of ‘intermediate distributivity’, as in Rodgers, Hammerstein & Hart wrote
musicals (?), which is true not because each wrote musicals of their own or because the three of them wrote
musicals together, but because Rodgers and Hammerstein collaborated to write musicals and so did Rodgers
and Hart. The definition in (5) can be straightforwardly extended to accommodate such cases.
3I will remain agnostic on the ontological status of these ‘collections’, more specifically the question of
whether direct predication over a plural denotation is possible, or whether they first have to shift into some
sort of group denotation as in Link (1984), Landman (1989).
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children gathered is collective with respect to the predicate as a whole (only groups can
gather) but distributive with respect to certain conceptual parts of the predicate meaning:
we can infer from it that each individual child was in the garden (Dowty (1987)). This
shows that the distinction between collectivity and P-distributivity is not very clear-cut;
rather, they represent the two extremes on a continuous scale of interpretations. Depending
on the lexical properties of the predicate in question, it may result in more implications for
the individuals and less implications for the group as a whole, or vice versa; there is no
clear boundary between ‘collective’ and ‘distributive’ predicates (cf. Dowty 1987).
Q-distributivity
Despite the many cases where distributivity effects can be accounted for in terms of direct
predication over a collection, several authors have shown that some distributive interpre-
tations cannot be reduced to the lexical meaning of a predicate (cf. Winter 1997, Brisson
1998). Here is an example of a sentence for which a purely lexical approach (like Scha’s)
does not completely cover the truth conditions for the different interpretations available:
(6) The children are hiding somewhere.
If we analyse the adverb somewhere as an existential quantifier over locations, an analysis
in terms of direct predication over a collection would result in the indefinite’s taking scope
over the entire plurality of girls:
(7) ∃x [place(x) ∧ hide in(the children,x)]
But this only allows an interpretation in which there is one place where the children are
hiding collectively, whereas (6) also has a distributive interpretation according to which
each individual child found a hiding place of its own. To derive the latter, the members of
the plurality the children need to take scope over the existential quantifier introduced by
the indefinite. And the only way to allow the children to have wider scope than somewhere
is to introduce another quantifier, as in (8):
(8) ∀x ∈ the children [ ∃y [place(y) ∧ hide in(x,y) ] ]
Such a quantificational analysis is generally formalised, following Link, with the help of a
D-operator, a covert quantifier comparable to overt each. Without this D-operator, the plural
denotation cannot take wide scope, and the meaning of the sentence is derived through
direct predication as in (7).
We find Q-distributivity with a diverse range of phenomena; let us have a look at a few
other examples. DI and/or CI are shorthand for ‘distributive interpretation’ and ‘collective
interpretation’, as defined in (5).
(9) The semanticists are walking or cycling.
⇐ For every semanticist x, x is walking or x is cycling. (DI)
⇐ The semanticists are walking or the semanticists are cycling. (CI)
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Sentence (9) is entailed by both of the statements below it, which correspond to two of its
possible interpretations. According to the first, the disjunction walking or cycling applies
to each individual semanticist, which means that (9) is compatible with a situation in which
part of the semanticists is cycling and the other part is walking. According to the second
interpretation, the disjunction walking or cycling applies to the collection of semanticists as
a whole: either they are all walking, or they are all cycling. While the second interpretation
can be analysed in terms of direct predication over a collection, the first cannot: in order
for the individual semanticists to take scope over the disjunction, we need a quantifier over
semanticists.
Sentence (10), like sentence (7), involves a quantificational expression:
(10) These artists dress in black one day a week.
⇐ For every artist x, there is one day a week y s.t. x dresses in black on y. (DI)
⇐ There is one day a week y such that every artist dresses in black on y. (CI)
Here, the quantifier expressed by the adverbial phrase can either take scope over the en-
tire sentence (resulting in a collective interpretation), or be interpreted in the scope of the
plurality (resulting in a distributive interpretation).
Our final example involves pronoun binding. Sentence (11) below has a collective in-
terpretation that requires that the boys are brothers; it also has an interpretation according
to which all boys have a different mother, which can only be accounted for assuming quan-
tification over boys with the pronoun their in its scope:
(11) The boys would be upset if John kissed their mother.
⇐ For every boy x, x would be upset if John kissed x’s mother. (DI)
⇐ The boys have the same mother and would be upset if John kissed her. (CI)
Sentence (12) is a similar example involving reflexive anaphora in Dutch (I use Dutch
because it lacks number marking on the third person reflexive pronoun, which will make it
particularly useful when we will compare the behaviour of plurals with that of group nouns
in section 2.2):
(12) De kinderen vinden zichzelf nogal slim.
‘The children consider themselves rather clever’
⇐ For every child x, x considers itself rather clever (DI)
⇐ The children consider the children rather clever (as a group). (CI)
To summarise, while simple distributive sentences may often be analysed in terms of P-
distributivity, the truth conditions of more complex cases involving scope interactions and
binding cannot be adequately captured without assuming covert quantification by some-
thing like a D-operator.
Hanna de Vries
2.2 Groups and group distributivity
Group nouns are singular nouns that refer to a seemingly plural entity, such as committee,
team, collection, set, council or group itself. In many contexts, they can be used inter-
changeably with a plural noun phrase that refers to the same collection of entities:
(13) a. The children/class

gathered in the garden.
met last week.








The sentences in (13) show that group nouns, like plurals, allow both collectivity and P-
distributivity. This is in line with our idea that both collectivity and P-distributivity are
based on world knowledge-based reasoning about parts and wholes in the context of predi-
cate meanings: groups, even if their denotation is atomic, have a clear part-whole structure
which should be able to support these inferences.
However, of the examples of Q-distributivity listed in section 2.1, all are unavailable
with group nouns. Below, I repeat the examples, this time with group noun rather than
plural subjects:
(14) The group (of semanticists) is walking or cycling.
6⇐ For every semanticist x, x is walking or x cycling. (DI)
⇔ The semanticists are walking or the semanticists are cycling. (CI)
We have seen in (13) that both a distributive and a collective interpretation are available if
the subject is a plural definite. However, if the subject is a group noun as in (14), only the
latter is available: (14) can only be false in a situation where some of the semanticists are
walking while the others are cycling.
Our next examples also run parallel to our earlier data in section 2.1, and show a similar
contrast between plurals and group nouns. (From now on, I will not write out the CI and
DI interpretations, but only indicate which of them are available.)
(15) The class is hiding somewhere. (only CI)
(16) This art collective dresses in black one day a week. (only CI)
(17) ?The class would be upset if John kissed their mother. (only CI)
(18) De klas vindt zichzelf nogal slim. (Dutch; only CI)
‘The class considers REFL.3SG/PL rather clever’4
4While (17) seems a bit awkward because of the combination of a singular antecedent and a plural pro-
noun, the Dutch anaphora data have no such problem, as the third person reflexive pronoun zichzelf is not
marked for number. As a consequence, it can be bound by singular as well as plural NPs. This rules out an
explanation of the contrast between groups and plurals in terms of number morphology.
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In each of these cases, the only available interpretation is the CI (hence, the original sen-
tence and the CI entail each other); distribution over individual group members is ruled out.
As a consequence, sentences (15) and (16) must mean that everyone hid in the same place
or dresses in black on the same day; sentence (17) presupposes that the pupils in the class
are siblings; and finally, sentence (18) can be true even in a situation where the individual
children do not consider themselves particularly clever, as long as they feel that their class
as a whole is.
It turns out that sentences with group noun subjects systematically lack an interpreta-
tion that their plural-subject counterparts do have: the Q-distributive interpretation, which
is derived by quantification over individual members of a collection. This is in line with the
common assumption (Landman 1989, Barker 1992, Schwarzschild 1996) that group noun
denotations are atomic (i.e. they lack an internal structure that is accessible to the com-
positional semantics) while definite plurals denote sums (entities with internal structure).
If a group noun denotation lacks internal structure, it has no individual members that can
be quantified over, and hence the D-operator cannot apply to it (or, depending on one’s
assumptions, applying the D-operator returns the group itself as the only accessible atom).
As a consequence, any distributive effects that we get with group nouns should be the result
of P-distributivity. In contrast, the members of a semantic plurality are standardly assumed
to be accessible to the compositional semantics by means of the D-operator, which means
that distributive effects with plurals may be analysed as either P- or Q-distributivity. The
contrast between (7-12) on the one hand and (14-18) on the other thus supports an analysis
of groups as atoms.
2.3 Group distributivity with a-indefinites
There is one apparent exception to the above generalisation. The sentences in (19) have
both a collective and a distributive interpretation, despite the fact that they seem to involve
a quantificational expression (the indefinites an entire pizza and a pink name badge):5
(19) a. The class painted a portrait of the Queen.
⇐ There is a portrait of the Queen that the class painted (CI)
⇐ For every pupil in the class x, x painted a portrait of the Queen (DI)
b. The team is wearing a blue shirt.
⇐ There is a blue shirt that the team members are wearing together (CI)
⇐ For every team member x, x is wearing a blue shirt (DI)
If we analyse the indefinites in (19) as existential quantifiers, we may expect these sen-
tences to lack a DI. According to the generalisation proposed above, group nouns do not
5Note that not all varieties of English allow these sentences - many English speakers that I consulted
prefer a dependent plural (portraits of the Queen or blue shirts), both with plural and group subjects. In
Dutch, where dependent plurality is optional but the singular is preferred, the equivalents of (19a-b) are
unproblematic:
(i) Het team draagt een blauw shirt. (CI/DI)
‘The team is.wearing a blue shirt’
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allow Q-distributivity because their denotation has no members that can be quantified over.
Hence, the existential quantifier denoted by the indefinite therefore takes scope over the
entire plurality, deriving the CI as the only possible interpretation of (19a-b). However,
contrary to this expectation, both sentences have a distributive interpretation as well; in the
case of (19b), it is even the preferred interpretation.
This apparent Q-distributivity over group nouns also happens with numerical indefi-
nites; examples like (20) seem to be fine in all varieties of English I have encountered:
(20) This batallion received four insignia. (CI/DI)
Finally, group distributivity is available with both direct and indirect indefinite objects:
(21) The children in Group A and Group B each made an origami animal. Group A gave
the animal to a teacher, Group B gave it to a parent. (CI/DI)
How to account for this apparent exception to the generalisation established in section
2.2? In principle, there are two possible ways out. The first is to reconsider the analysis
of groups as atoms and claim that in cases like the above, the individual group members
are accessible to the semantics, perhaps because group denotations can shift to pluralities
under certain circumstances. (Such a shift is proposed by Landman (1989) for independent
reasons.) This solution would account for the exception; however, it would also render the
general pattern inexplicable, so going down this road creates more problems than it solves.
The second way out is to claim that there is something special about indefinites. It is
this approach that I will develop here.
3. P-distributivity beyond unary predicates
In this section, I argue that the group distributivity cases with indefinite objects are all cases
of P-distributivity. While the examples of P-distributivity we have seen so far all involved
intransitive predicates, with distribution over a single argument, there is no a priori reason
that would limit P-distributivity to only one argument. Just as we can analyse sentence
(22a) in terms of direct predication over a plurality (as in (22b)), we can analyse a sentence
like (22c) as a relation between two pluralities (as in (22d); cf. Scha 1981). And just as
(22b) is vague with respect to the involvement of particular individuals, (22d) is vague
with respect to the particular relations: we cannot tell if all the boys and all the girls were
involved in the kissing, how many boys were kissed by each of the girls or how many girls
kissed each of the boys, but we do know that individual boys were kissed by individual
girls.
(22) a. The girls laughed.
b. laugh(the girls)
c. The girls kissed the boys.
d. kiss(the girls,the boys)
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In order to be able to extend this analysis to cases of group distributivity with indefinite
objects, we cannot analyse the indefinite as a generalised quantifier with existential force.
As we have seen in our discussion of sentences (7) and (22), an existential quantifier intro-
duced by the indefinite would necessarily take scope over the whole group, and the only
available interpretation would be the collective one.
I propose that the indefinite in (22a) and similar sentences denotes a property, which
I view here as something very similar to a group - a higher-order entity that allows P-
distributivity over its individual instantiations. Thus, just as the verb in (21c) denotes a
relation between two pluralities, it denotes a relation between a property and a group in
(22a-b); and just as with (21c), any inferences about individual members of the group or
individual instances of the property are due to P-distributivity, not based on quantification.
Neither the idea of property-denoting indefinites nor the idea of polyadic P-distributivity
is new. The latter was already assumed in Scha (1981) and empirically motivated (although
not very explicitly) in Winter (2000); the former are the subject of a growing body of
semantic literature starting with Milsark (1974). In the remainder of this section, I will
discuss the polyadic P-distributivity analysis of cases like (22a) in more detail.
3.1 The P-distributivity analysis in detail
Property-type indefinites and individual correlates of properties
While classical Montagovian semantics treats indefinite noun phrases as generalised quan-
tifiers with existential force, non-quantificational analyses of indefinites have been pro-
posed in the literature at least since Carlson (1977) and Milsark (1974), in which they can
denote kinds or properties, and the work of Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982), in which they
denote free variables. McNally (1992) and Zimmermann (1993) propose that indefinites
may also be interpreted as properties (of type 〈e, t〉) even outside of the predicate posi-
tion, and this idea has subsequently been used to account for a wide range of semantic
phenomena.
McNally (1992) discusses property-type indefinites in relation to there-sentences, argu-
ing that the traditional distinction between weak and strong NPs of Milsark (1974) can be
reduced to the distinction between property-type and quantificational NPs. Zimmermann
(1993) proposes that opaque verbs like seek take property-type arguments. van Geenhoven
(1998) links the property analysis of indefinites to the syntactic phenomenon of noun in-
corporation, proposing a semantic counterpart of this operation that is also argued for in
Farkas and de Swart (2003) and Chung and Ladusaw (2004), among others. Assuming that
indefinite PP complements denote properties, Mador-Haim and Winter (2007) argue that a
puzzling contrast between the interpretations of certain PPs follows naturally.
A recurring question in the literature on property indefinites in argument position is how
they compose with the predicate. After all, unless the relevant predicates are systematically
ambiguous, there is a type mismatch between the argument (which is of type 〈e, t〉) and the
predicate function (which wants an entity). In principle, there are two ways to go about this:
there might be some special operation that composes verbs and property-type arguments
(e.g. Chung & Ladusaw’s Restrict or Van Geenhoven’s Semantic Incorporation), or the
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property might shift into its entity correlate (cf. Chierchia 1984, McNally 1992, 2005). I
think the second approach is the most appropriate in this case: we have been talking about
P-distributivity as involving reasoning about entities with a salient part-whole structure,
and an individual correlate of a property seems just this kind of thing.6 However, ultimately
it does not really matter what implementation we choose. We can chose to formalise the
property-based account of polyadic P-distributivity in terms of entity correlates just to make
the semantics more explicit, but if future work should show that there is actually some
kind of Semantic Incorporation at work here, the idea behind this analysis would not be
invalidated. The important point is that the indefinites in question denote properties, and it
is this point that I will stress in the remainder of this paper.
3.2 Alternatives to the P-distributivity analysis
In this final section, I will discuss two alternative analyses of the group distributivity data
that do not involve property-type indefinites: group credit and quantification over kinds. I
argue that neither of these alternative approaches is able to fully account for the data.
Group credit. One might argue that we could analyse group distributivity as a special
case of a ‘group credit’ interpretation, which in turn is a special case of collectivity. Con-
sider the following sentence:
(23) The team is holding up a trophy.
Sentence (23) can be true if only one of the team members (say, the captain) is actually
holding a trophy: because the captain represents his team in doing so, the entire team ‘takes
credit’ for the trophy-holding and (23) can be considered true on its collective interpreta-
tion. Similarly, we might say that if some representative proportion of the team is wearing
a blue shirt, the team as a whole is wearing a blue shirt, and therefore the collective sen-
tence The team is wearing a blue shirt can be true in a ‘distributive’ situation where each
individual team member is wearing their own shirt.
If group distributivity is a special case of group credit, it should behave in a similar
way. In particular, we expect the group-distributive reading to persist under an existential
6Chierchia (1984), following a much earlier observation by Frege, notes that we can attribute properties to
entities (The sky is blue) but also to other properties (e.g. (Being) blue is beautiful), suggesting that properties
can function both as predicates and as objects. He proposes a typeshift ∩〈et,e〉 that turns predicative expressions
(type 〈e, t〉) into their entity correlates (type e), such that a sentence like Blue is beautiful receives the logical
form beautiful(∩blue). The semantics of our polyadically P-distributive sentence The team is wearing an
orange vest, then, can be derived according to the following steps:
• (i) λxλy[(wear(x))(y)](orange vest) (type mismatch)
(ii) λxλy[(wear(x))(y)](∩orange vest)
(iii) λy[(wear(∩orange vest))(y)]
(iv) λy[(wear(∩orange vest))(y)](the team)
(v) (wear(∩orange vest))(the team)
Thus, the sentence denotes a relation between two higher-order entities.
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paraphrase, just as happens with the group credit-reading of our trophy sentence. However,
this is not the case:
(24) a. There is a trophy that the team is holding up.
⇔ The team is holding up a trophy.
b. There is a blue shirt that the team is wearing.
6⇔ The team is wearing a blue shirt.
Sentence (24a) shares its truth conditions with (23): it is still true if the trophy is held
up by no team members but the captain. Sentence (24b), however, cannot be interpreted
distributively unless we read a blue shirt as ‘a kind of blue shirt’. In other words, it does not
have the same truth conditions as its non-paraphrased counterpart. This contrast between
group credit and group distributivity cannot be explained under an analysis that treats them
as essentially the same phenomenon. I therefore conclude that this kind of analysis cannot
fully account for the group distributivity data.
Quantification over kinds. The second alternative analysis is based on the aforemen-
tioned observation that sentence (24b) is compatible with every individual team member
wearing their own shirt if we interpret a shirt as ‘a kind of shirt’. From this, we might
conclude that the group distributivity effect in The team is wearing a blue shirt is a matter
of quantification over kinds as well: the noun shirt does not denote a set of ordinary objects
but a set of kinds (each of them a subkind of shirt), and The team is wearing a blue shirt
is interpreted as the assertion that there is a subkind of shirt (say, the polo shirt) of which
the team members are wearing instantiations. Again, this assertion is compatible with a
situation in which every team member is wearing their own shirt.
Quantification over kinds may be able to explain part of our group distributivity data -
it is hard, if not impossible, to prove that it is not involved - but it does not explain all of it.
In particular, there is a contrast between a- and some-indefinites that would remain quite
mysterious under this analysis. Consider the following data:
(25) a. A rare owl was sighted in this forest recently.
b. Some rare owl was sighted in this forest recently.
(26) a. The team is wearing a blue shirt.
b. The team is wearing some blue shirt.
The pair of sentences in (25) shows that some-indefinites can quantify over kinds as easily
as a-indefinites can: (25a) and (25b) are both grammatically correct, and truth-conditionally
equivalent. However, this is not the case for the sentences in (26), which are both grammat-
ical but do not have equivalent meanings. Sentence (26b) requires that every team member
is wearing the same kind of blue shirt; if half of the team is wearing a polo shirt and the
other half a button-down shirt, the sentence is false. This follows when we analyse the sen-
tence in terms of existential quantification over kinds. However, (26a) can be true in such
a situation, which cannot be explained under a quantification-over-kinds analysis.
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How, then, does the P-distributivity analysis account for the difference between a and
some? Note that the other phenomena that have been argued in the literature to involve
property-type indefinites all show the same contrast when the available interpretations are
concerned:
(27) Be-predicates:
a. John is a linguist.
b. John is #some linguist. (on the intended reading)
In (27a), it is predicated of John that he is a linguist - a linguist is of type 〈e, t〉 and the
sentence is entirely on a par with, for example, a sentence like John is tall. In contrast,
(27b) cannot express such a simple predication. Its most readily available interpretation is
a taxonomic one that may be paraphrased as ‘John is a (specific or nonspecific) kind of
linguist’; in addition, it has an (albeit slightly strange) identity reading with is as a full
verb, paraphraseable as ‘There is some linguist and this person is John’. Neither reading
involves a predicate linguist of type 〈e, t〉, suggesting that this is not a possible denotation
for the indefinite some linguist. Similarly:
(28) Opaque verbs (Zimmermann 1993):
a. John is looking for a secretary.
b. John is looking for some secretary.
(29) Eigenspace semantics (Mador-Haim and Winter 2007):
a. We’re far from a gas station.
b. We’re far from some gas station.
On its opaque reading, (28a) is interpreted to mean that John is looking for any secretary,
not a particular one; it also has a transparent reading according to which there is a particular
secretary that John is looking for. In contrast, (28b) only has the transparent reading (in
addition to a ‘some kind of’-reading comparable to the one in (27b)). If we claim, with
Zimmermann, that opaque readings result when the verb takes a property-type complement,
this again suggests that property denotations are unavailable for some-indefinites.
The same pattern again appears in (29a-b). The universal interpretation of the indefinite
a gas station in (29a) can be accounted for under the assumption that it denotes a property:
the location function denoted by the preposition, then, returns the location or ‘eigenspace’
of the set of gas stations, rather than that of a particular individual gas station. Being far
from a collection of elements entails being far from each element in the collection, hence
the universal interpretation. Again, the some-indefinite in (29b) lacks this interpretation.
All in all, the above data suggest that some-indefinites cannot receive a property denota-
tion, which is why sentences involving such indefinites systematically lack interpretations
that their a-indefinite counterparts do have. Since the P-distributivity approach attributes
certain group distributivity effects to the involvement of property-type indefinites, it pre-
dicts, correctly, that these effects will not occur with some.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper I have argued that we need two different semantic mechanisms to fully account
for distributivity phenomena. We need Link-style operator-based distributivity to deal with
sentences that involve scope-taking elements or pronoun binding; this kind of distributivity
is unavailable with group nouns, which supports an atomic analysis of these nouns. The fact
that we still get distributive inferences with group nouns shows that we also need a Scha-
style lexical distributivity mechanism. The puzzling behaviour of sentences with a group
noun subject and an indefinite object can also be explained in terms of lexical distributivity,
under the common assumption that indefinites may denote properties.
References
Brisson, Christine. 1998. Distributivity, maximality and floating quantifiers. Doctoral
Dissertation, Rutgers University.
Carlson, Greg. 1977. Reference to kinds in English. Doctoral Dissertation, UMass.
Champollion, Lucas. 2010. Parts of a whole: Distributivity as a bridge between aspect and
measurement. Doctoral Dissertation, UPenn.
Chierchia, Gennaro. 1984. Topics in the syntax and semantics of infinitives and gerunds.
Doctoral Dissertation, UMass.
Chung, Sandra, and William Ladusaw. 2004. Restriction and saturation. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Dowty, David. 1987. A note on collective predicates, distributive predicates, and All. In
Proceedings of the Third Eastern States Conference on Linguistics.
Farkas, Donka, and Henriette de Swart. 2003. The semantics of incorporation: From argu-
ment structure to discourse transparency. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
van Geenhoven, Veerle. 1998. Semantic incorporation and indefinite descriptions: seman-
tic and syntactic aspects of noun incorporation in West Greenlandic. Stanford: CSLI
Publishing.
Heim, Irene. 1982. The semantics of definite and indefinite noun phrases. Doctoral Dis-
sertation, UMass.
Kamp, Hans. 1981. A theory of truth and semantic representation. In Formal methods
in the study of language, ed. Jeroen Groenendijk, Martin Stokhof, and Theo Janssen.
Amsterdam: Mathematisch Centrum.
Landman, Fred. 1989. Groups. Linguistics and Philosophy 12:559–605, 723–744.
Link, Godehard. 1983. The logical analysis of plurals and mass terms: a lattice-theoretical
approach. In Meaning, use and interpretation of language, ed. Rainer Bauerle,
Christoph Schwarze, and Arnim von Stechow. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Link, Godehard. 1984. Hydras. On the logic of relative constructions with multiple heads.
In Varieties of formal semantics, ed. Fred Landman and Frank Veltman. Dordrecht:
Foris.
Link, Godehard. 1987. Generalized quantifiers and plurals. In Generalized quantifiers:
linguistic and logical approaches, ed. Peter G
Hanna de Vries
Mador-Haim, Sela, and Yoad Winter. 2007. Non-existential indefinites and semantic incor-
poration of PP complements. In Proceedings of SALT 17.
McNally, Louise. 1992. An interpretation for the English existential construction. Doctoral
Dissertation, UCSC.
McNally, Louise. 2005. Properties, entity correlates of properties, and existentials. Un-
published ms. http://www.upf.edu/pdi/louise-mcnally/_pdf/publications/
McNally_EntityCorrs.pdf.
Milsark, Gary. 1974. Existential sentences in English. Doctoral Dissertation, MIT.
Roberts, Craige. 1978. Modal subordination, anaphora, and distributivity. Doctoral Dis-
sertation, UMass.
Scha, Remko. 1981. Distributive, collective and cumulative quantification. In Formal
methods in the study of language, ed. Jeroen Groenendijk, Martin Stokhof, and Theo
Janssen. Amsterdam: Mathematisch Centrum.
Winter, Yoad. 1997. Choice functions and the scopal semantics of indefinites. Linguistics
and Philosophy 20:399–467.
Winter, Yoad. 2000. Distributivity and dependency. Natural Language Semantics 8:27–69.
Zimmermann, Thomas Ede. 1993. On the proper treatment of opacity in certain verbs.
Natural Language Semantics 1:149–179.
Utrecht institute of Linguistics OTS
Trans 10
3512 JK Utrecht
h.devries1@uu.nl
